No Need to Fear Robots: Online “Bot” Use under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by Bariso III, Peter F.
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
2016
No Need to Fear Robots: Online “Bot” Use under
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Peter F. Bariso III
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Bariso III, Peter F., "No Need to Fear Robots: Online “Bot” Use under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act" (2016). Law School
Student Scholarship. 757.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/757
2 
 
No Need to Fear Robots:  Online “Bot” Use under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Peter F. Bariso III* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) is a powerful statute that can combat online theft 
and protect digital information.1  Congress originally discussed these objectives in the early 1980s 
and enacted the CFAA in 1986 in the midst of the Digital Revolution.2  As digital machinery began 
to quickly replace analog and mechanical devices, Congress needed a statute with the ability to 
grow alongside this new technology.3  The CFAA was meant to be malleable and adapt over time 
with ever-changing innovation.4  At inception in 1986, however, the idea of a global internet, not 
to mention numerous other online technologies that now exist, was not even conceivable. 
Congress designed the CFAA to be flexible because digital technology was new, but this 
flexibility has been misused.  If courts can freely expand the statute as broadly as they please, 
prosecutors will arguably be incentivized to exploit the CFAA and seek criminal sanctions based 
on untenable statutory interpretations.5  The Committee on the Judiciary expressly recognized that 
deterring unwanted computer actions begins with the private website owners and not federal law 
                                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2007, Indiana University Kelley School of 
Business.  Thank you to Professor David Opderbeck for helping with this comment, from basic idea to finished 
product.  Thank you also my family and to all of the members of the Seton Hall Law Review. 
1 See infra Part II. 
2 See infra Part II; Digital Revolution, TECHNOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/23371/digital-
revolution (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).   
3 See infra Part II; Digital Revolution, TECHNOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/23371/digital-
revolution (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).  
4 See infra Part II; Digital Revolution, TECHNOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/23371/digital-
revolution (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).  
5 See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act , 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1557 
(2010) (“The CFAA is a remarkably broad statute, and . . . federal prosecutors eventually will try to exploit the 
breadth and ambiguity of the statute to bring prosecutions based on aggressive readings of the statute.”).  
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or the court system.6  The CFAA and courts cannot be used to rubberstamp every website owner 
practice with a seal of approval, making any other action illegal.  Not every objectionable internet 
behavior is criminal and covered by the CFAA.  “More comprehensive and effective self-
protection by private business” is the best means of prevention, and website owners bear this 
responsibility, not the government.7   
A hacker can be either “an expert at programming and solving problems with a computer,” or 
“a person who illegally gains access to and sometimes tampers with information in a computer 
system.”8  While the former definition encompasses benign activity, the latter has gained much 
more notoriety.  This secondary definition focuses on CFAA violators in that it covers individua ls 
who do not have authorization to access a computer as well as those who go beyond their 
authorized access.9  Therefore, at least as to the second definition, hackers are synonymous with 
criminal violators.  The first definition, while entirely accurate and still popular within the 
computer programming world, has transitioned outside of that sphere and somewhat merged with 
the second definition.  The term hacker is now used much more broadly to add a negative 
connotation to anyone who uses a computer in a new or unconventional, although perfectly legal, 
way.10  By using a word that connotes illegal behavior but may describe legal actions, website 
owners and prosecutors have persuaded courts to prohibit benign internet conduct.11 
Website owners have successfully induced the court to extend the CFAA beyond what 
Congress intended.12  This has resulted in criminal punishment for behavior not originally 
                                                                 
6 S. REP. 99-432, 3, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2481. 
7 Id. (quoting Report on Computer Crime; Task Force on Computer Crime, Section of Criminal Justice, American 
Bar Association; June 1984). 
8 Hacker Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriamwebster.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2015). 
9 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008). 
10 Robert Siciliano, Are All Hackers Bad?, MCAFEE (Sep. 2, 2014), http://blogs.mcafee.com/consumer/are-all-
hackers-bad (Tesla, Facebook, and Google all use individuals traditionally thought of as “hackers” in many ways). 
11 Id. 
12 See, infra Part III.  
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conceived as such under the CFAA’s purview.  As technology changes the ways in which the 
internet is used and online business is carried out, website owners try to protect their informa tion 
and competitive edge by any means necessary.  If private information is truly hacked, as per the 
second definition above, and acquired through unauthorized means, the behavior may be violat ing 
the CFAA.  While this is not disputed, online businesses sometimes seek to punish users who 
gather publicly available information with identical penalties.13  Automated programming code, 
often called “bots,” “scrapers,” “scrubbers,” or “data mining,” has become a useful tool to amass 
large amounts of data much faster and more efficiently than any individual or group of users.14  
Computer programmers generally develop an automated program that, once set in motion, works 
independently to pool whatever information the programmer created the “bot” to seek out.  While 
this may be used to hack onto websites or servers and steal protected information, it is more 
commonly used to gather innocuous, public data.15  The majority of “bot” executions search out 
and compile public information into user-friendly databases.16 
Independent of the CFAA, website owners are free to develop their own contracts with website 
users.  These contracts, often called Terms of Service, set the parameters of use for anyone who 
visits the website.  They are often long, carefully drafted, legal documents which are overlooked 
                                                                 
13 Id. 
14 Michael Schrenk, Webbots, Spiders, and Screen Scrapers: A Guide to Developing Internet Agents with 
PHP/CURL 6 (2nd ed. 2012). 
15 Data Mining and Analytics, SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL AND APPLIED MATHEMATICS, 
http://www.siam.org/activity/dma/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
16 AVI RAPPAPORT, ROBOTS & SPIDERS & CRAWLERS: HOW WEB AND INTRANET SEARCH ENGINES FOLLOW LINKS TO 
BUILD INDEXES, available at http://cis.poly.edu/cs912/rappoport.pdf; See also, Semrush, Semrush Bot, available at 
http://www.semrush.com/bot/ (“Most bots are both harmless and quite beneficial.”); but see, Incapsula 2014 Global 
Bot Traffic Report: Understanding Bot behavior and threats to websites 2, available at 
http://lp.incapsula.com/rs/incapsulainc/images/2014-bot-traffic-report.pdf (reporting a new 50/50 split between good 
“bot” traffic and “bad” bot traffic on the internet over the past two years) (It should be noted, however, that 
Incapsula, Inc. specializes in website security and protection from “bots” and is  thus incentivized to paint landscape 
with an increased threat.  Semrush on the other hand is a marketing company that provides bot services to its 
customers and is equally incentivized to portray “bots” in a positive light.  At the same time, the sources 
theoretically measure different values—the former being number of “bots” and the latter “bot” traffic.) 
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by the general public.17  On occasion users have to click “I agree” to pass onto the website, but in 
most instances they are not even conspicuous and can only be viewed via a link on the bottom of 
the site.  In any case, website owners are free to draft these Terms of Service for their individua l 
domain names, thereby creating a contractual relationship with individual users which impose 
restrictions on the use of the website.18  The problem arises when these Terms of Service are 
violated and the website owner seeks to use the CFAA as a remedy in lieu of a proper breach of 
contract claim. 
Commenters and the courts alike have disagreed over whether the CFAA can be used to 
criminalize these contractual breaches in all situations.  Some previous comments have focused on 
individual users obtaining public information from websites generally, without reference to 
“bots”.19  Others focused on whether a breach of a website Terms of Service could qualify as 
“unauthorized access” or “exceeding authorized access.”20  Additional comments addressed Terms 
of Service breaches and civil claims under the CFAA.21 
While most of these comments agree that the courts should not apply the CFAA to a broad 
contract-based theory of liability, the majority argue that not every contract breach to acquire 
                                                                 
17 Rachel Feltman, Londoners accidentally pay for free Wi-Fi with a firstborn, because no one reads anymore, THE 
WASHINGTON POST  (Sep. 29, 2014) (Proving that no one reads Terms of Service, an experiment in London had 
people agree to pay for WiFi service in exchange for permanent loss of a child); See, also, Mike Masnick, To Read 
All Of The Privacy Policies You Encounter, You'd Need To Take A Month Off Fro m Work Each Year, TECHDIRT 
(Apr. 23, 2012), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120420/10560418585/to-read-all-privacy-policies-you-
encounter-youd-need-to-take-month-off-work-each-year.shtml (Noting that for the average internet users, reading all 
the Terms of Service agreements on every webpage visited would take one month a year). 
18 Best Practices for Drafting Terms of Use, 6TH ANNUAL E-COMMERCE BEST PRACTICES CONFERENCE, 
https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/event/266629/media/slspublic/BPfnlPresentation0608.pdf, (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2015). 
19 Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Control 
Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63 MD. L. REV. 320, 368 (2004). 
20 Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting Access and Authorization in Computer Misuse Statutes , 78 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1596, 1630 (2003). 
21 Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2186 (2004); but see Caroline G. Jones, 
Computer Hackers on the Cul-De-Sac: Myspace Suicide Indictment Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Sets 
Dangerous Precedent, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 261, 267 (2011) (“theoretically the law fits the crime as charged”). 
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public information on a website should be immune from the CFAA.22  Some commenters argue 
that code based tools that provide extra security and deterrence should be a guide for the CFAA.23  
They argue that, if a website requires individual input or employs additional measures before 
access, such as checkout page encryption, CAPTCHA code, or internet protocol blocks, and 
subsequent use is obtained despite this, the situation is more akin to unlawful hacking and should 
be grounds for a CFAA claim.24   
This Comment focuses on the use of electronic code and automated “bots,” specifically on 
their use in buypage, or checkout page, encryption, Completely Automated Public Turing test to 
tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA) protections, Internet Protocol blocks, and other 
measures used by website owners to enforce their Terms of Service contracts.  Those commenters 
that argued the CFAA applies to all “bot” use often cite to prosecutorial discretion as a way to 
remedy the gap between less harmful “benign hacking” of public information and serious 
violations of the CFAA.25  This public policy argument, while reasonable in theory, could have 
disastrous consequences in practice if an alleged violator piques the interest of a politician or 
prosecutor looking to make a name for themselves or set an example of the alleged violator.  Courts 
similarly have analyzed breach of Terms of Service CFAA claims in different ways.  While some 
courts found contractual breaches a sufficient basis for a CFAA claim26 others recognized the 
dangers of such a broad policy.27  
                                                                 
22 Jones, supra note 21, at 265–66. 
23 Id. at 271; see also Katherine Mesenbring, Field, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining Employees' 
Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act , 107 MICH. L. REV. 819, 821 (2009). 
24 Jones, supra note 21, at 271. 
25 Mesenbring, supra note 23, at 838–840 (focused more on employee/employer relationships and CFAA). 
26 Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
27 LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009); see also, United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 
863 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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Part II of this Comment will first discuss an overview of automated software robots and their 
history in society.  Part III will discuss a brief overview of the CFAA.  Part III will also focus on 
the background of the CFAA.  Part IV will discuss the history of automated software robots in the 
court system and evolving views on their legality.  Part IV will also address previous CFAA 
decisions under civil law and the statute’s potential expansion into the criminal sector.  Part V will 
highlight the benefits of automated “bots” in the internet and how they can be useful in a multitude 
of areas.  This part will then explain how the “damage” and “unauthorized” or “exceeding 
authorized” access prongs of the CFAA are not inherently met when “bots” are employed contrary 
to a website’s Terms of Service.  Part V will also discuss the dangers in allowing prosecutors to 
have too much discretion under the CFAA.  Lastly, Part VI will conclude this Comment. 
 
II. The Pros and Cons of Automated Software Robots 
 
“Bots,” like hacking, can be beneficial or injurious, and can either spur technological progress, 
or harm valuable resources, depending on the means and ends for which they are used.28  The same 
technology goes into both “beneficial webbots” and malicious ones.29  “Bots” do not inherently 
change the structure and meaning of the CFAA.  Just like other powerful tools, if used improperly 
they can become a means to violate the CFAA. 
“Webbots” are computer programs that are usually created for one specific purpose.30  They 
automatically carry out their function once triggered by either a user action or automatically upon 
the occurrence of an event.31  Once set in motion, “webbots” work according to their programmed 
                                                                 
28 Schrenk, supra note 14, at 6. 
29 Id. 
30 Internet Bot, TECHNOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/24063/internet-bot (last visited Feb. 12, 2015). 
31 Id. 
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orders.32  Based on the creation of web and robot, a “webbot” works over the internet 
independently and does whatever it was created to do without sustained human involvement.33 
Automated “webbots” can amass information at a much larger scale and much faster speed 
than any individual or large group of people.34  “Webbots” can be created as a way to automate 
virtually any online task.35  Since constant human input is not required, the “bot” works much 
more quickly and without any risk of human error. 
At inception, “webbots” were seen as a limitless “untapped source of potential projects for 
software developers and a bountiful resource for business people.”36  “Webbots” were first 
developed to customize online applications and get catered results through internet web 
browsers.37  Even now, the true potential of “webbots” goes beyond any current technologica l 
boundaries.38  “Bots” are used primarily for legitimate business purposes to promote efficiency or 
sometimes just for convenience.   
“Bots” are now a part of daily life.  Even a standard search engine like Google or Yahoo! uses 
“bots” called “search engine spiders” to quickly find relevant results based on a given user inputted 
search term.39  Even individuals hoping to get a good reservation for dinner can make use of 
                                                                 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Schrenk, supra note 14, at10. 
35 Id. 
36 Internet Bot, supra note 30 at 9. 
37 Id. 
38 Schrenk, supra note 14, at 9. 
39 Internet Bot, supra note 30.  As an example, when someone uses Google to search for information that person 
types their query in the search box and prompts Google’s “bots” to scour the internet for posted content that 
corresponds to the queried word or phrase.  The “bots” used by Google are obviously substantially advanced and can 
even predict what you are trying to have them search for before you even finish typing.  They can also correct your 
misspellings based on what the “bot” thinks you meant to type.  At the same time, users can override the “bot” by 
using quotes around specific words as many “experienced” searchers may do. 
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“bots.”40  There are also conspiracy theorists who believe that “bots” can be used to predict major 
events and even an apocalypse.41 
An increasingly large part of the economy is shifting towards automation.  Customer service,42 
stock trading and banking,43 surveillance,44 shopping, and numerous other fields are moving away 
from human-dominated roles toward computerized solutions.45  Naturally, there is much debate on 
the pros and cons of a largely computer-run economy as compared to traditional human-driven, 
day-to-day tasks.46  Over the next two decades, it is estimated that 50% of all jobs in America will 
be automated.47 
An increasing number of companies are now automating their customer service operations.  
Automated customer service solutions can reduce the operating and training costs that accompany 
a staff of human customer service agents.48  The use of “bots” and avatars, as they are often called 
in customer service, is not without flaws, but it promotes competition and innovation.  No logical 
                                                                 
40 Jessica Sidman, What’s the Toughest Reservation in D.C.? , WASHINGTON CITY PAPER (Dec. 17, 2013). 
41 Tom Chivers, ‘Web-bot project’ makes prophecy of 2012 apocalypse, THE TELEGRAPH (Sep. 24, 2009), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/6227357/Web-bot-project-makes-prophecy-of-2012-apocalypse.html  
(Obviously this “bot” has since been proved not as all-knowing as Google’s search predicting capability, see supra 
note 39.). 
42 Alisa Kongthon, Chatchawal Sangkeettrakarn, Sarawoot Kongyoung & Choochart Haruechaiyasak, Implementing 
an Online Help Desk System Based on Conversational Agent , PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 
ON MANAGEMENT OF EMERGENT DIGITAL ECOSYSTEMS, Oct. 27, 2009, available at 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1643823.1643908. 
43 Andrei A. Kirilenko & Andrew W. Lo., Moore’s Law versus Murphy’s Law:  
Algorithmic Trading and Its Discontents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 51 (2013), available at 
http://www.argentumlux.org/documents/Moores_Law_vs_Murphys_Law_Spring_2013_JEP.pdf.  
44 Ross Anderson, An Eye Without an ‘I’: Justice and the Rise of Automated Surveillance , THE ATLANTIC (June 14, 
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/06/an-eye-without-an-i-justice-and-the-rise-of-
automated-surveillance/258082/. 
45 See, infra Part IV. 
46 Id. 
47 Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to 
Compterisation? (Oxford Martin Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology,Working Paper, Sept. 17, 2013) 
available at 
http://www.futuretech.ox.ac.uk/sites/futuretech.ox.ac.uk/files/The_Future_of_Employment_OMS_Working_Paper_
0.pdf; Aviva Hope Rutkin, Report Suggests Nearly Half of U.S. Jobs Are Vulnerable to Computerization , MIT 
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Sept. 12, 2013), available at http://www.technologyreview.com/view/519241/report-
suggests-nearly-half-of-us-jobs-are-vulnerable-to-computerization/. 
48 Kongthon, et al., supra note 42. 
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argument has been advanced that suggests that the government should control the use of customer 
service bots or make it criminal. 
Stock trading, particularly by hedge funds, has transitioned away from human buy and sell 
orders to computer algorithms designed to pick up on clues and trade faster than any human.  So 
called “quant funds” or “high- frequency traders” use automated execution technology, a type of 
“bot,” to execute trades based on certain triggers that the computer reads.49  For example, when 
the volume of trades on a stock hits a certain point, signaling a large block of trading, the “bot” 
can act and execute trades before the incoming block trade is completed and before the stock price 
continues to rise. 
While some have argued this financial strategy based on “bots” was responsible for the recent 
financial crisis50, others praise its efficiency and ability to generate a profit.51  Even small-time 
stock traders who trade based on limit orders use “bots” whether they know it or not.  Charles 
Schwab, a brokerage and banking company, allows any investor to buy stocks using a limit order.52  
This means that the computer will buy the stock automatically when it reaches a given price.53 
Financial trading “bots” can be used with less than noble intentions, but the solution is not 
criminalizing their use, it is competition.  Institutional investors often use dark pools to keep their 
trades somewhat insulated from hedge fund “bots”.  Often using their own “bots”, dark pools will 
execute large trades outside of the public forum so that quant funds see no triggers until the trade 
is completely executed.  Some quant funds have responded by monitoring large transactions and 
                                                                 
49 RISHI K. NARANG, INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: A SIMPLE GUIDE TO QUANTITATIVE AND HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING 
5 (2013). 
50 SCOTT PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A NEW BREED OF MATH WHIZZES CONQUERED WALL STREET AND 
NEARLY DESTROYED IT  (2011). 
51 Narang, supra note 49. 
52 Stock Order Types: Limit Orders, CHARLES SCHWAB, http://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/nn/articles/Order-
Types-Getting-to-Know-the-Basics#limitorder (last visited Nov. 1, 2014) 
53 Id.  (A sell limit order can also be executed which naturally uses a “bot” to only sell once a given price it 
attained.). 
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essentially using bandwidth as a trigger for trading.  Once again, competition has spurred private 
markets to combat this problem.54  The process accelerates innovation and society is improved as 
a whole, whereas criminalizing the conduct initially does nothing but ensure one side mainta ins 
freedom from competition. 
“Bots” are used by individuals as well as large corporations.  While some “hackers” may use 
“bots” to pilfer data from private online sources, that behavior is far from the norm.55  On an 
individual scale, executives can use “bots” to sift through millions of news articles and compile 
only relevant stories, substantially shortening the morning reading.56  They can also be used by 
intellectual property holders to search out websites and ensure their patented creation is not being 
used elsewhere.57  At the same time, just about every large internet company uses “bots”.  Massive 
internet corporations like Google and Yelp all use “bots” in a multitude of ways and users benefit 
from these “bots” daily.58  
On third-party websites, when the “bot” owner is not the website owner, “bots” are most often 
used for one of three purposes: buypage encryption; internet protocol blocks; and CAPTCHA 
code.  Buypage, or checkout page, encryption is used by some website owners to block access to 
the checkout page of a website.59  It can have a valid purpose, most notably to restrict purchase 
ability to only those individuals who can legally buy—be it alcohol to minors or guns to registered 
                                                                 
54 Simone Foxman, Those Flash Boys: How the “Navy Seals” of Trading are Taking on Wall Street’s Predatory 
Robots, QUARTZ (Mar. 31, 2014), http://qz.com/138388/how-the-navy-seals-of-trading-are-taking-on-wall-streets-
predatory-robots/. 
55 Schrenk, supra note 14, at 325 (This so-called “dark side” use of “destructive webbots” is a small percentage of 
those in existence). 
56 Id at 18. 
57 Id. 
58 What is Yelp’s Recommendation Software, YELP INC., http://www.yelp-support.com/article/What-is-Yelp-s-
recommendation-software?l=en_US (last visited Nov. 1, 2014) (As discussed in Part IV, many of these same 
companies are those seeking to persuade courts to condone third-party “bot” use and allow them to set the terms of 
the CFAA through their Terms of Service.); see Internet Bot, supra note 30. 
59 Brief for Plaintiff-United States at 18, United States v. Lowson, 2010 WL 9552416 (D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2010) (No. 
CRIM. 10-114 KSH). 
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individuals.  In this internet age, as compared to brick-and-mortar stores, it is much harder to limit 
alcohol sales to minors, or to restrict firearms purchases, or to protect credit card information.60  
Buypage encryption can cut out purchasing ability to certain people.  It restricts certain individua ls 
from tampering with the checkout page.  This is done by the websites to shield them from liability. 
Internet protocol (IP) blocks are also widely used to restrict unwanted users.  They are designed 
to prevent certain users originating from known locations or regions from calling up a website.  
They can be used to prevent “hackers” from injecting viruses, to block access to banking 
information, and to stop mass spam emails.61  They cannot, however, be used at the whim of the 
website owner to enforce his or her preference.62  When Verizon blocked IP addresses from certain 
regions in Europe as a way of limiting spam to its members, it led to a class action lawsuit when 
users could not access needed emails.63  Circumventing IP blocks has blossomed into a necessary 
market as well.  Masking IP addresses can be a proactive way to self-protect from viruses or 
hacking.64  Because IP addresses are unique to each user, they can compromise a user’s location 
or identify.  Individual users can just as easily hide their IP addresses through various free 
programs on the internet.65   
                                                                 
60 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Williams & Allison Schmidt, The Sales and Marketing Practices of English-Language 
Internet Alcohol Vendors, 109 SOC’Y FOR STUD. ADDICTION RES. REP. 432 (2014); But see, Granholm v. Heald, 544 
U.S. 460 (2005) (The court disagreed with New York that more protection was needed to protect online liquor stores 
from access by minor.  The court found “little evidence that the purchase of wine over the Internet by minors is a 
problem,” because minors need “instant gratification” and can go to local liquo r stores in less time than internet 
retailers.). 
61 John Gartner, Verizon's E-Mail Embargo Enrages, WIRED, (Jan. 10, 2005), 
http://archive.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2005/01/66226. 
62 Nate Anderson, Verizon Proposes Settlement For Class Action Lawsuit , (Apr. 5, 2006), 
http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2006/04/6525-2/. 
63 Id. 
64 UnThreat technology, UNTHREAT ANTIVIRUS, http://www.unthreat.com/technology (last visited Feb. 12, 2015). 
65 MASK MY IP, http://www.mask-myip.com/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). 
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CAPTCHA code, unlike the other two measures, is primarily used to foil automated “bots”.66  
As the name implies, CAPTCHA stands for Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell 
Computers and Humans Apart and is designed to “capture” and trick computers.67  CAPTCHA 
has a multitude of applications, only one of which is preventing malicious attacks on websites.68   
On a macro level, devices like CAPTCHA that distinguish humans from computers cannot 
“guarantee that bots won’t read the pages; it only serves to say ‘no bots, please.’”69  CAPTCHA 
can also be used to advance artificial intelligence and lead to technological progression.70   
At the same time, CAPTCHA defeating “bots” may be necessary for some users.  Individua ls 
with vision problems are often thwarted by CAPTCHA code which is based on distorted images. 71  
Alternatives to CAPTCHA that can be used by the visually impaired are being created, but lag far 
behind in popularity to CAPTCHA.72  Until these alternatives catch up, certain sections of the 
population need “bots” that can help them get around CAPTCHA devices and access a site just as 
anyone else can. 
 
III. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
 
i. Brief Overview of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
                                                                 
66 Brief for Plaintiff-United States at 19, United States v. Lowson, 2010 WL 9552416 (D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2010) (No. 
CRIM. 10-114 KSH). 
67 Luis von Ahn, Manuel Blum & John Langford, Telling Humans and Computers Apart Automatically: How Lazy 
Cryptographers do AI, 47 COMM. ACM 57, 58 (2004), available at http://www.captcha.net/captcha_cacm.pdf. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id., at 59–60. 
71 Computer Pioneer Aids Spam Fight, BBC NEWS, (Jan. 8, 2003), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2635855.stm. 
72 Hannah Alvarez, Think Your Site Needs CAPTCHA?  Try These User-Friendly Alternatives, USER TESTING, (Apr. 
9, 2014), http://www.usertesting.com/blog/2014/04/09/think-your-site-needs-captcha-try-these-user-friendly-
alternatives/. 
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The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) prohibits “access” of a computer either 
“without authorization” or “exceeding authorized access.”73  The statute focuses on information 
protected for national defense,74 financial records,75 and certain other private information obtained 
fraudulently.  As compared national defense documents and bank financial records, with private 
information the statute is more specific and requires actual “damage” to a “protected computer.”76 
The fundamental component of the CFAA is “access.”  Access, however, is an antiquated 
notion based on how computers worked in the 1980s when the CFAA was originally devised.  
Today with the internet dominating most computing and cybersecurity concerns, the notion of 
“access” makes little sense in many contexts.  Historically, when computers were hardwired they 
needed to be physically accessed to be used, but the internet has completely changed this line of 
thinking.  The internet has stripped part of what the CFAA was designed to do.  Because of this, 
prosecutors have successfully persuaded courts to expand the scope of the CFAA.  This behavior, 
however, can lead to a widening gap, in terms of Congressional intent, between the CFAA at 
inception and what is has become.  Courts should leave it to Congress to update the CFAA into 
the modern technological world. 
 
ii. Background of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was the product of an American Bar Association (ABA) 
report and Congressional debate.  In 1984, the American Bar Association Task Force on Computer 
                                                                 
73 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008). 
74 Id. § 1030(a)(1). 
75 Id. § (a)(2)(A). 
76 Id. § (a)(5)(A). 
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Crime issued the Report on Computer Crime that found about 48% of the 1,000 private and public 
agencies surveyed had experienced some form of computer crime in the previous year.77  
According to the Report on Computer Crime, the most serious types of computer crime consisted 
of theft of property, data destruction, financial skimming, software destruction, and fraud.78 
This ABA report prompted Congress to reexamine computer crime and enact the Compute r 
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) in 1986.79  The Congressional Committee on the Judiciary 
recognized that computer crimes cause severe financial losses and regulation was needed to 
safeguard against potential monetary theft.80  The Committee also realized that identifying 
information, passwords, and medical records should be protected and their theft prohibited, even 
absent discrete financial loss.81 
Prior to enacting the CFAA, it was suggested that the federal statute should be broad “so that 
no computer crime [was] potentially uncovered.”82  The Committee expressly rejected this 
suggestion and sought to limit the CFAA to Federal Government computers where “certain 
financial institutions are involved or where the crime itself is interstate in nature.”83   
Congress designed the CFAA to criminalize computer theft, fraud, hacking, and acts that 
damage electronic data and security.84  Congress limited the CFAA’s reach based on three core 
                                                                 
77 AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT ON COMPUTER CRIME -TASK FORCE ON COMPUTER 
CRIME (June 1984), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=95114 [hereinafter ABA 
COMPUTER CRIME REPORT]. 
78 Id. (The report found action needed to be taken to discourage and punish “the use of computers to steal tangible or 
intangible assets, the destruction or alteration of data, the use of computers to embezzle funds, the destruction or 
alteration of software, and the use of computers to defraud.”) 
79 S. REP. 99-432, supra note 6, at 2. 
80 Id.; ABA COMPUTER CRIME REPORT, supra note 77. 
81 S. REP. 99-432, supra note 6, at 2–3; ABA COMPUTER CRIME REPORT, supra note 77. 
82 S. REP. 99-432, supra note 6, at 4; ABA COMPUTER CRIME REPORT, supra note 77. 
83 S. REP. 99-432, supra note 6, at 4; ABA COMPUTER CRIME REPORT, supra note 77. 
84 S. REP. 99-432, supra note 6. 
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ideas:  the first based on national security; the second focused on financial institutions; and the 
third based on private electronic theft.85   
Under the national security provision, the individual must “knowingly access[] a computer 
without authorization or exceeding authorized access” and obtain information protected by an 
“Executive order or statute . . . against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or 
foreign relations.”86  An individual can also be guilty based on national security protection if they 
“intentionally, without authorization to access any nonpublic computer of a department or agenc y 
of the United States, access[] such a computer of that department or agency that is exclusively for 
the use of the Government of the United States.”87 
To protect financial information, the CFAA criminalizes an individual who “intentiona lly 
accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . 
information contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or of a card issuer . . . [or] of 
a consumer reporting agency on a consumer.”88   
Private electronic information is also protected by the CFAA when an individual “knowingly 
and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorizatio n, or exceeds 
authorized access” and this conduct furthers the fraud, “unless the object of the fraud and the thing 
obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the value of such use is not more than $5,000 
in any 1-year period.”89  The CFAA, like many Congressional statutes, can only apply to limited 
private actions based on the commerce clause.  The only private electronic information protected 
is that on “protected computers,” defined as the computers of a financial institution or the United 
                                                                 
85 Id. 
86 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) (2008). 
87 Id. at § 1030(a)(3). 
88 Id. at § 1030(a)(2)(A). 
89 Id. at § 1030(a)(4). 
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States Government or, if not exclusively used by either of those two entities, computers that affect 
interstate or foreign commerce.90 
Each of these three core ideas centers on the principles of damage, unauthorized access, and 
exceeding authorized access.  In order to violate the CFAA, the individual must first be 
“unauthorized” or must deliberately “exceed[] authorized access.”91  “Unauthorized access” is 
reserved for situations where the individual is not granted access.92  It does not speak to the means 
of access, but simply whether that individual was allowed.93  “Exceed[ing] authorized access” 
covers individuals who are actually authorized to use a given computer.94  It is only invoked when 
the individual goes beyond his or her access and actually obtains information that he or she was 
not entitled to, or alters information in the computer when he or she was not allowed to do so.95 
At the same time, there must be a real, tangible harm and loss to meet the “damage” 
requirement of Section 1030(e)(8).96  “Damage,” encompasses harm to data or equipment that 
results in a loss.97  “Damage” relates to physical, tangible impairment that leads to a real pecuniary 
loss.98  The damage must be quantifiable and reach the aggregate threshold of $5,000.99  It cannot 
be an arbitrary, theoretical harm. 
 
IV. The Court System and the CFAA 
 
                                                                 
90 Id. at § 1030(e)(2). 
91 Id. at § 1030(a)(1). 
92 See Power Equip. Maint., Inc. v. AIRCO Power Servs., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1296 (S.D. Ga. 2013). 
93 Id. 
94 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2008). 
95 Id. at § 1030(e)(6). 
96 See Czech v. Wall St. on Demand, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1108 (D. Minn. 2009); Yoder & Frey Auctioneers, 
Inc. v. Equipment Facts, LLC, No. 14-3002, 2014 WL 7247400, at *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 22, 2014). 
97 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) (2008). 
98 Wall St. on Demand, Inc. 674 F. Supp. 2d at 1108. 
99 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I) (2008). 
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i. Automated Software Robots in the Legal System 
 
With the advent and ever-expanding capability of “bots,” courts have inconsistently applied 
the CFAA to them.  The CFAA’s flexibility has been interpreted by different courts in different 
ways.  Back in 2000, eBay, an online auction site, tried to defend its business against “bots” using 
the CFAA.100  EBay argued that Bidder’s Edge (BE), a company that used “bots” to search, copy, 
and aggregate eBay listings—as well as other online auction company listings—in one place, was 
in violation of the CFAA.101  BE did not host any auctions, but based its business on allowing 
customers to view auctions from various sites in one place.102  The United States District Court, 
for the Northern District of California, allowed an injunction against BE because it used “bots” in 
violation of eBay’s Terms of Service.103  Without deciding on any one ground, the court sided with 
eBay that when the software robot—which could execute thousands more tasks than a human in 
the same amount of time—was used, it drained eBay’s capacity and resources, increasing the  
likelihood of a system crash.104  The court only enjoined BE’s activity as long as “bots” were 
involved and made clear that no information obtained with a non-automated program was 
precluded.105 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, overseeing the District Court in 
California that decided Ebay, Inc., vacillated on the relevance of “bots” to a valid CFAA claim. 106  
                                                                 
100 Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal.2000). 
101 Id. 
102 Id at 1061. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1061-62 (The District Court allowed a preliminary injunction without evidence of any real crash, but 
merely a theoretical increased likelihood, but the case did not progress further.); Id. at 1071 (The court also 
recognized that “eBay does not claim that this consumption has led to any physical damage to eBay's computer 
system, nor does eBay provide any evidence to support the claim that it may have lost revenues or customers based 
on this use[.]”). 
105 Id. at 1073. 
106 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856, 862–63 (9th Cir. Cal. 2012). 
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When a former employee of an executive search firm convinced some of his former colleagues , 
who still worked at the firm, to transmit him confidential information from the company’s server 
to help start a competing business, the employer sought sanctions via the CFAA.107  The current 
employees were allowed to access the database, but could not disclose the confidential informatio n 
to someone outside of the company.108  Because of this, the employer argued that the “exceeding 
access” requirement was met.109  The court avoided the question of whether Terms of Service 
could serve as the basis for a criminal CFAA claim.110  The court did, however, find that using 
“bots” in contravention of a Terms of Service policy does not constitute “exceeding authorized 
access.”111  The CFAA is not concerned with misappropriation liability and “bots” that violate a 
contractual Terms of Service are outside the scope of the CFAA.112  
The same District Court in California tried to reconcile past cases when Craigslist, another 
independent sales website, sought to limit “bot” use from a competitor through its Terms of 
Service.113  3Taps was a company that employed “bots” to copy content posted on Craigslist, 
aggregate it, and republish.114  After 3Taps ignored a cease and desist letter, Craigslist brought a 
CFAA suit against 3Taps.115  Craigslist argued that 3Taps violated the Terms of Service it 
implicitly agreed to by using Craigslist’s website, and thus exceeded its authorized access under 
1030(e)(8) of the CFAA.116  The court looked to Nosal and found the term “exceeds authorized 
                                                                 
107 Id. at 856. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 863 (“We need not decide today whether Congress could base criminal liability on violations of a company 
or website's computer use restrictions.”). 
111 Id. 
112 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863. 
113 Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 968–70 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
114 Id. at 966. 
115 Id. at 967. 
116 Id. 
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access” only relates to access restrictions and not to how the information is used.117  The District 
Court avoided the key question of whether a website’s Terms of Service violation “can ever 
support liability under the CFAA.”118  The District Court did, however, find the cease and desist 
letter determinative for “unauthorized access” under 1030(a)(1).119  Because Craigslist denied 
3Taps access “for any purposes” via the cease and desist letter, any later use violated the CFAA.120 
Another Federal District Court in similar circumstances to those presented in California 
Federal Court did not grant an injunction to the company seeking to insulate itself from “bots” 
through Terms of Service.121  Southwest Airlines used a business model that awarded customers 
better boarding options depending on how quickly they checked-in once they were allowed.122  
Boardfirst used “bots” to automatically check-in Southwest customers as quickly as possible once 
they were allowed by Southwest.123  Twenty-four hours before the flight Southwest allowed 
customers to check-in and any customers that paid Boardfirst $5 were virtually guaranteed to be 
checked-in first and thus granted priority boarding.124  This is because the “bots” used by Boardfirst 
could complete their task in a fraction of the time any individual customer could.  The “bots” could 
execute the task they were programmed to do and checked-in customers instantly, much faster than 
any actual Southwest customer could type southwest.com let alone go through the steps to check-
in.  Using a similar breach of the Terms of Service logic, Southwest argued Boardfirst was not 
                                                                 
117 Id. at 968 (citing Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860–62). 
118 Craigslist Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d at 969. (The Court need not decide whether violating ‘restrictions on access to 
information’ contained in a website's terms of use can ever support liability under the CFAA.”).  
119 Id. at 969. 
120 Id. 
121 Southwest Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C.,2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96230 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007). 
122 Id at *1 (All customers were able to check-in for their flight beginning twenty-four hours before the departure 
time.  Those customers that checked-in as soon as possible once this ban was lifted—ie 23 hours before the flight as 
opposed to 2 hours before the flight—received better boarding options once the flight actually did depart.). 
123 Id. 
124 Id at *1-2 
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only violating the Terms of Service, but also the CFAA.125  The United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Texas found that, contract claims aside, there was no federal violation126  
The CFAA charge was not valid and could not be used to sustain an injunction, especially given 
that Southwest’s website was a “publicly available website that anyone [could] access and use.”127  
The court was not swayed by a Terms of Service violation and found no actual impairment or 
damage.128 
In a recent CFAA case involving “bots,” criminal charges were brought against an events ticket 
reseller for using automated software.129  Like many previous “bot” cases, a website owner tried 
to argue that criminal fraud occurs when the website Terms of Service are violated whereas the 
defendant argued the website owner’s charge sought to regulate a legal secondary market.130  
Lowson, the defendant, and his company purchased large blocks of event tickets using “bots” and 
then resold the tickets in the secondary market for a profit.131  Online ticket vendors used certain 
measures like buypage encryption, IP blocks, and CAPTCHA code to try and ensure the general 
public would be able to purchase tickets with no one gaining an advantage.132  Lowson and his 
company used “bots” to avoid these measures and purchase tickets that were otherwise available 
to them and the rest of the general public.133  The only issue was in the way Lowson’s team 
purchased tickets.  Lowson was indicted, but the case was resolved prior to a trial with all parties 
                                                                 
125 Id at *2. 
126 Id at 6-7. 
127 BoardFirst, L.L.C.,2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96230 at *14. 
128 Id at 15. 
129 United States v. Lowson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145647(D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2010). 
130 Id at *1. 
131 Id. 
132 Id.; Brief for Plaintiff-United States at 18, United States v. Lowson, 2010 WL 9552416 (D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2010) 
(No. CRIM. 10-114 KSH). 
133 Lowson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *4. 
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agreeing out of court.134  This case, like much of the law regarding the CFAAs reach as it pertains 
to “bots,” failed to take a strong stance for or against their inherent legality. 
 
ii. Civil Application of the CFAA in Other Contexts 
 
Courts have permitted civil CFAA claims to succeed based on Terms of Service violations, but 
allowing these violations to carry into the criminal context can be a dangerous precedent.  In the 
civil context when automated programming “bots” and “data mining” were involved, the court 
found CFAA violations without substantial analysis. 
When a website owner sought to enforce its Terms of Service and stop defendants from sending 
“unsolicited bulk e-mail” messages, more commonly known as spam, to its members, it brought a 
CFAA claim in the Eastern District of Virginia.135  The defendant, LCGM, maintained numerous 
America Online (AOL) memberships that provided the company with access to AOL chatrooms. 136  
With this access, LCGM used an extractor “bot” to collect email addresses of other AOL 
members.137  LCGM, which operated pornographic websites, sent approximately 300,000 
unsolicited emails a day to the AOL email addresses it collected with the “bot.”138   
The District Court found AOL’s Terms of Service controlling on what constitutes authorized 
access.139  Without significant analysis, the court found AOL member email addresses to be 
protected information that was proprietary to AOL.140  Because sending spam was contrary to 
                                                                 
134 Id. at *1; Brief for Plaintiff-United States at 16–18 United States v. Lowson, 2010 WL 9552416 (D.N.J. Oct. 12, 
2010) (No. CRIM. 10-114 KSH). 
135 America Online v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va.1998). 
136 Id. at 448. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 451 (“These actions were unauthorized because they violated AOL's Terms of Service”). 
140 Id. at 450. 
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AOL’s Terms of Service, the court reasoned that it constituted “exceeding authorized access” 
when obtained via “extractor software programs”—data mining, “bots”.141  The court determined 
that LCGM was liable under §1030(a)(2)(C) for exceeding any access AOL had granted it as a 
member when it used “extractor software programs” that violated AOL’s Terms of Service.142  The 
court also found the requisite damage to AOL’s computer network because the defendants used 
“bots” to “camouflage[] their identities, and evade[] plaintiff's blocking filters and its member s' 
mail controls.”143     
In a similar case in the Northern District of Iowa, AOL sought to enforce its Terms of Service 
through the CFAA against a third-party email sender.144  Defendant National Healthcare Discount, 
Inc., purchased leads (email addresses) from an independent contractor and sent marketing 
materials to the purchased addresses.145  Despite recognizing that “the evidence presented at trial 
failed to clear the murky water sufficiently” to determine if Terms of Service violations constitute 
“without authorization,” the court relied on its preliminary conclusion, without analysis, that it 
“exceeds authorized access.”146  The court also found the requisite damage based on evidence that 
each unsolicited email sent over AOL’s system cost AOL $0.00078 and diminished AOL’s 
capacity to serve its customers.147   
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also found that an express provision 
limiting “the use of scrapers” in a website’s Terms of Service to be dispositive on whether access 
was authorized.148  Absent an express provision, inferring a violation of the CFAA would not be 
                                                                 
141 LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d at 450. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 451. 
144 Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890 (N.D. Iowa 2001).   
145 Id. at 896. 
146 Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d at 899 (N.D. Iowa 2001). 
147 Id. (citing America Online, Inc. v. National Health Care Discount, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1274-75 (N.D. 
Iowa 2000)). 
148 Ef Cultural Travel Bv. v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. Mass.2003). 
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practical and the website owner would likely have to show that the information was confidentia l.149  
EF Cultural Travel, a travel company, brought suit under the CFAA against a competitor 
(Explorica) as well as the “scraper” creator company (Zefer).150  Zefer, the “bot” creator, 
developed a computer program that copied price information for various travel options on EF 
Cultural Travel’s website.151  Explorica hired Zefer to create this tool and provide it with EF 
Cultural Travel’s pricing information.  Explorica used the information to set its prices slightly 
below Explorica’s and gain a competitive advantage.152  EF Cultural sued under both the CFAA 
and copyright statutes.  The court found the copyright claim to be meritless, but allowed the CFAA 
claim even though the behavior did not violate any stated Terms of Service.153 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that Explorica could have compiled the same 
database of EF Cultural Travel’s pricing information, albeit not as quickly, without “scrapers,” but 
differentiated the two situations without any further explanation.154  The court held that it “would 
raise serious public policy concerns” to allow the CFAA to enforce an explicit provision in a 
website’s Terms of Service that limits competitors from manually using public information on the 
website to create a database, but failed to address how a competitor that compiles the same 
information more efficiently with “bots” could be condemned without issue.155  While the court 
stated these broad propositions without practical support and its arguable general fear of “bots” is 
unfounded, neither issue directly influenced the court’s holding.  The key reason for the court’s 
civil injunction was based on the existence of a confidentiality agreement signed between 
                                                                 
149 Id. at 63. 
150 Id. at 60. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 62–63. 
154 Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d at 60 (“Strictly speaking, the accessed information is…available to anyone who views the 
site.”). 
155 Id. at 63. (citing Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 516-18 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
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defendant employee of a competitor and the website owner which clearly exceeded access of the 
computer servers.156   
Some courts analyzing a CFAA claim based on a beach of contract recognized the danger in 
allowing contracts to form the basis of federal statutory violations.157  When an employee had 
access to an employer computer and network, but violated a term of his employment contract by 
using the computer to email company documents, including financial statements and client lists, 
to his personal computer prior to leaving the company, the United States Court of Appeals found 
there was no valid CFAA claim.158   
LVRC brought a CFAA claim against a former employee alleging that his use of company 
computers violated§1030(a)(2)(4) because it was unauthorized and his use of company email to 
send himself documents exceeded any authorization he was given.159  Brekka, the former employee 
was given access and log-in information for LVRC’s computers as part of his employment.160  The 
information he emailed to himself likewise was related to his work for LVRC.161  After 
termination, Brekka used his unexpired log-in information to send himself additional information 
from his company email address.162  LVRC argued this use was unauthorized or alternative ly 
exceeded any authorization he had when his employment terminated.163 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that Brekka may have acted against LVRC’s 
wishes, but that does not rise to a CFAA violation.  Just because the individual violated a duty of 
loyalty or state law claim does not mean they violated the CFAA.164  “Nothing in the CFAA 
                                                                 
156 Id. at 61. 
157 LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. Nev. 2009). 
158 Id. at 1128–30. 
159 Id. at 1128. 
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164 Id. at 1135. 
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suggests that a defendant's liability for accessing a computer without authorization turns on 
whether the defendant breached a state law duty of loyalty to an employer.”165  The court 
understood that contracts cannot govern distinct federal laws.166  The individual also logged onto 
the company website to access statistics and other company information using an old password, 
over a year after his employment ended.167  Even after the employment ended and the individua l 
became a competitor, the court found no basis for a CFAA claim.  So long as individuals are 
authorized to use a computer, they “remain authorized… even if the [individual] violates those 
limitations.”168 
 
V. The CFAA Does Not Criminalize The General Use Of Automated “Bots” That May Be 
Contrary To Terms Of Service Contracts 
 
“Bots” do not inherently violate the CFAA.  They are tools that can be used both legally for 
valid business purposes or illegally to cause harm.  Like almost any other new technology, “bots” 
have unknown potential and can be either abused or esteemed.169  New technology scares people.  
Until they can fully understand it, some people will fear it and try to condemn its use.170  Because 
of this, leaving “bot” use practices to prosecutorial discretion has failed.  It has proven to be an 
insufficient way of dealing with the new technology and its potential criminal component. 
The internet is not a foreign unknown like it once was and has not been so for a long time.  In 
2011, the United States Census Bureau found that nearly 76% of households had a computer, up 
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169 See, e.g., ARTHUR C. CLARKE, PROFILES OF THE FUTURE, HAZARDS OF PROPHECY:  THE FAILURE OF 
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from just under 62% in 2003 and roughly 8% in 1984 when the CFAA was first conceived.171  It 
is not reasonable to argue that just because a term references computers it is automatica l ly 
ambiguous and confusing.  While some commenters argue the CFAA is ambiguous and can be 
stretched by courts to cover a wide array of behavior, most of these arguments focus on the internet 
as a great unknown.172 
At the same time, if we are to follow previous commenters reasoning that the language is 
ambiguous because of the technical nature of the internet and website use, it cannot be followed 
that the statute suddenly covers Terms of Service contract issues without some legisla t ive 
guidance.  “Legislatures and not the courts should define criminal activity.”173  Congress could not 
have conceived that Terms of Service breaches would fall under the provisions of the CFAA 
because websites didn’t even exist in 1986 when the statute was adopted.174  On April 30, 1993, 
CERN published a statement that put CERN software into the public domain, essentially making 
the internet available to the public.175  In a time before publicly-available computers or websites, 
Congress could not have contemplated “unauthorized access” to include violation of a website’s 
Terms of Service.176  When the CFAA was created, the idea of a global internet used daily by 
hundreds of millions of people was not even contemplated.  While it is important for statutes to be 
flexible and grow with time, allowing such profound changes as granting private website owners 
discretion to set the limits of criminal activity cannot be permitted. 
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In enacting the CFAA, the Judiciary Committee found Federal criminal penalties “appropriate 
punishment for certain acts” not for every unwanted computer activity and it should be reinforced 
with improved security programs.177  If the CFAA can be used to criminalize breach of contract 
disputes, everything from “making a fake Facebook account for your cat” to letting your “friend 
log in to your Pandora account could land you with felony charges,” all because you clicked “I 
agree.”178 
Breach of contract based CFAA claims could easily prove unmanageable given the prevalence 
of arbitration clauses.  Recently many online companies have incorporated arbitration clauses into 
their Terms of Service.179  If breach of a Terms of Service agreement can serve as the basis for a 
CFAA violation, proof of the breach would be a required element of the offense.  This element 
may not be so easy to adjudicate, however, given required forums specified in the contract.  “Mini-
trials on breaches of contract would be required to establish criminal liability.”180 
Some have argued that as a broad policy, Terms of Service violations cannot serve as the 
foundation for a CFAA claim, but using automated software code is more akin to unlawful 
“hacking” and should be barred by the CFAA.181  According to proponents of this theory, the 
purpose of automated programs is to bypass security and defeat barriers to access.182  “Data 
mining,” “scrubbers,” “scrapers,” and other automated programs, however, are less about attacking 
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security measures and more focused on efficiency.183  The CFAA cannot be applied by fiat to any 
Terms of Service contractual theory just because a “bot” was used. 
 
i. Automated Bots Are Useful Tools to Promote Competition and Improve 
Efficiency 
 
“Data mining” is a valuable tool with “enormous application in numerous fields.”184  
According to the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics International Conference on Data 
Mining, high-performance analysis and algorithms can pool large, complex datasets and extract 
useful information for businesses.185 
Automated programming code, just like anything else, can be used properly and for a benefic ia l 
purpose or can be used to deleterious ends.  The purpose of the CFAA is to criminalize certain 
illegal behavior over the internet in regards to computer access.  “Bots,” just like hacking, connotes 
a scary and malicious image, but only because certain groups have been successful in persuading 
courts and people in power to believe so.  The technology that goes into a “beneficial webbot” as 
compared to a destructive one designed to disrupt networks, infect servers with viruses, or “hack” 
private information, is identical.186  The main difference is intent.  The CFAA cannot be used to 
broadly sweep over all automated programs that collect public information and should be reserved 
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for only those that violate the Act’s provisions, either by using fraud and causing damage, mining  
confidential financial information, or accessing protected government information. 
“Webbots” have vast untapped potential and can make e-commerce and internet use as a whole 
immensely more efficient.187  “Webbots” can acquire useful information in an infinitesimally small 
fraction of the time it takes an individual or even a team of individuals.  “Webbots” can be created 
for specific tasks and can automate virtually any process, notifying a user only when something 
requires their attention.188  While some of those tasks may be illegal, others are not only legal, but 
beneficial.  Speed and efficiency are key for a business advantage and “webbots” can even be used 
to locate and track information quickly, as is the case with this google short url footnote. 189  
“Webbots” improve business efficiency and competition.  A sweeping policy against them all, 
aside from being overbroad and reaching perfectly legal actions, will have a severe chilling effect 
that will hurt economic growth.190 
Everything from customer service, to stock trading and banking, to surveillance, is progressing 
towards automation.191  While some people appreciate the efficiency and cost reductions that go 
along with automation, others prefer a reversion back to pre-robot interaction.192  Preferences are 
permissible, but they do not correspond to legality.  While automated customer service is not 
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something most consumers want, few would argue that it should be criminalized.  It is likely that 
nearly half of all jobs in America will be automated in the next 20 years.193  Opponents of this 
argue that unemployment will rise and the economy will suffer.  Proponents, however, argue that 
machines will likely not replace human involvement in the economy, but will actually allow 
individuals to focus on other tasks and improve efficiency.194 
While many customers would prefer interaction with a real human being, they would not prefer 
the increased costs that go along with it.  There are some inherent flaws, and “bots” can be created 
with nefarious intent, but the pros outweigh the cons.  Automated business solutions can reduce 
operating and training costs, promote competition and innovation, and protect individua l 
privacy.195   
The solution for overcoming competitive “bot” use is not criminalizing it outright, but allowing 
free competition for non-harmful “bots” and focusing enforcement efforts only on those acts that 
actually violate the CFAA by causing damage or accessing unauthorized, non-public information.  
Otherwise, large companies with more bargaining power can seek to criminalize innocent conduct 
and insulate themselves from any real competition.196 
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Automated “bots” are used by the same companies that seek to criminalize the behavior by 
those that visit the companies’ sites.  Buried as one of Yelp’s restrictions on its Terms of Service 
page is a prohibition on “any robot, spider, site search/retrieval application, or other automated 
device, process or means to access, retrieve, scrape, or index any portion of the Site or any Site 
Content.”197  To maintain its competitive edge and ensure it provides a valuable service however, 
Yelp uses automated bots regularly on its site.198  There is even a video explaining the automated 
software, how it was designed, and how it automatically and efficiently seeks out certain posted 
material for exclusion without human input.199  The company goes so far as to seek feedback from 
the public to improve its “bots.”200  As is the natural competitive process, marketing companies 
have emerged to defeat Yelp’s “bots” and avoid its automated filters.201  Just like any other “bots,” 
defeating Yelp’s automated bots can have nefarious intent.  The main reason these defeating “bots” 
are used however, is to preserve legitimate, positive reviews.202  Nevertheless, the intent is to get 
around Yelp’s “bots.”  Clearly this behavior is frowned upon by Yelp.  No one has sought crimina l 
punishment against Yelp when the site uses its own “bots” to maintain the integrity of its reviews .  
If, however, these marketing companies used “bots” that were smarter than Yelp’s own “bots” to 
preserve their positive reviews, somehow Yelp would argue it becomes a criminal violation. 
As discussed, “bots” are most often used for one of three purposes on third-party websites: 
buypage encryption; internet protocol blocks; and CAPTCHA code.203  “Bots” are used in these 
arenas both for benign and malicious purposes. While some users employ “bots” to illegal ends, 
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others have valid, beneficial reasons.  On checkout screens, or buypages, “bots” can be used 
illegally to extract others’ purchasing information, but also legally to access checkout pages and 
purchase goods efficiently and quickly.  Companies that seek to criminalize all bot use do not do 
it for altruistic reasons, but mainly to limit competition and insulate themselves.  Website owners 
can freely determine what is illegal and what is not at the federal level if the CFAA will blindly 
enforce any action that may be against the preferences of private website owners and contrary to 
the private Terms of Service contracts they create with users.  
While it has been argued that using a “bot” on a website’s buypage is “akin to drilling through 
the side of a bank vault,”204 the analogy only holds if the purpose of the drilling is to put more 
money in the bank.  Buypage encryption can be used legitimately by website owners to restrict 
purchases for certain individuals.205  When used properly it can help the website owner limit his 
or her liability.206  Some websites, however, use it to stop purchases that occur in quick succession, 
a clear indication of “bot” use.  In this regard, the website is stopping valid sales that bring the site 
more revenue faster.  Just as with any “bots,” use on buypages can be benign and done to efficient ly 
pay the website or can be done with nefarious intent.  The CFAA should be narrow enough to 
effectively handle the latter without criminalizing the former.  Legal “bot” use that is unwanted 
can be limited through a buypage block, but the access is not unauthorized and thus not illegal.  It 
is up to website owners to keep out who they do not want, not the courts.   
Internet protocol (IP) blocks can help website owners to keep “hackers” out and not allow them 
to damage information,207 but they cannot be installed to bottleneck certain users or enforce 
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preferences in all situations.208  If left up to the individual websites to determine legality and that 
is freely enforced by the CFAA, “IP blocking can have profound impacts on the ability to 
communicate freely.”209  If any user who gets around an IP block is violating the CFAA, any 
validly used IP masking tool is a criminal offense.  Individual users who want to protect their 
identity and location and avoid viruses themselves, can hide their IP addresses using a number of 
tools on the internet,210  Theoretically then, anyone who hides their IP address should face federal 
criminal charges.  Using a “bot” versus doing it yourself should have no impact on the outcome.  
Because courts have argued it would be against public policy to hold individuals liable crimina lly 
just because a website would prefer they not do something,211 the fact that they use a “bot” to do 
the same should be of no importance.   
CAPTCHA code, like most other devices employed by websites can serve a valid purpose as 
protection from illegal uses, but allowing any user navigation that conflicts with website tools like 
CAPTCHA code to be criminalized by the CFAA is a slippery slope.  With CAPTCHA code, 
unlike buypage encryption or IP blocks, “bots” are the principal targets.212  CAPTCHA does, 
however, have numerous uses and effects besides preventing malicious attacks on websites.213   
Website owners can use CAPTCHA code as a way of enforcing their preferences against “bots,” 
but using the federal government through the CFAA to carry out these preferences is reaching too 
far.  Even worse than making those who want to protect their IP addresses criminals, certain 
disabled people need CAPTCHA defeating software.  Criminalizing these “bots” would make any 
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visually impaired person a potential criminal offender if they use legal software to improve their 
internet experience.214 
 
ii. Automated Bots Do Not Inherently Cause Damage to any Statutorily Protected 
Computer Nor Presumptively Violate the CFAA 
 
“Bot” use to acquire otherwise public information does not cause the requisite damage to any 
protected computer.  Using terms like “hacking” and “virtual breaking and entering” connotes 
destruction of property, but persuasive language is not the same as actual damage.  While the 
damage need not be physical destruction of the computer or server, there must be a tangible 
negative harm to the website or the owner’s system.  Criminal punishment is not justified by a 
theoretical, non-quantifiable harm.215 
While some website owners seeking to enforce their Terms of Service through the CFAA have 
successfully convinced courts that “bots” damage computer systems,216 their proof of damage was 
unpersuasive.  Most arguments that “bot” activity causes damage relate to bandwidth, server 
capacity, and the ability of other users to access the site.  Website owners argue that because “bots” 
can search through data at a much faster rate than individuals they “consume at least a portion of 
plaintiff's bandwidth and server capacity.”217  The argument is akin to using more than your 
allotment of a finite resource so there is less for everyone else.  Even without evidence that this 
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actually cost the website owner revenue or customers, the court found the requisite damage.218  
The key distinction for the court was the use of “bots.”  If a group of people engaged in the same 
behavior and used the same share of bandwidth it is highly unlikely the website owner would have 
sought help from the CFAA and the federal courts. 
This deference to the website owner’s discretion touches on the real reason “bots” are targeted 
by website owners and as a matter of public policy.  They are used primarily by competitors.  
Website owners have convinced the courts that “bots” are akin to unauthorized hacking in order 
to prevent competition in a public forum.  The real impetus for website owners is not actual harm 
to their computer systems but protection from increased competition.219  "Established online 
merchants have a substantial incentive … to interfere with the flow of price and product  
information on the Internet.”220 
In many cases, the “bots” do exactly what an individual user would and provide the same 
economic benefit to a website.  In a similar case to Bidder’s Edge, ticket resellers were indicted 
under the CFAA for purchasing bulk event tickets.221  Ticketmaster doesn’t mind if someone buys 
all of the tickets they sell, considering that is exactly what they are in business to do.  But they 
successfully got a competitor indicted for doing the same thing just because the competitor planned 
to resell the tickets later for a mark-up.222  Either way, Ticketmaster sold the tickets they wanted 
to sell. 
In other cases, “bots” pool public information off of websites for use in marketing or other 
business practices.  Courts have allowed CFAA claims to persist even when the information 
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obtained was public simply because the website owner argued the “bot” impaired the website’s 
capacity to serve the rest of its customers.223  Congress clearly did not intend the CFAA to be a 
tool against economic competition and protectionism especially given most legislation in the area 
of economic activity favors free market competition and penalizes anti-competitive practices.224 
“Bot” use that goes against a website’s terms of service is also not inherently unauthorized or 
exceeding authorized access.  Courts have previously held that contractual restrictions, while they 
may speak to misappropriation, do not invoke the CFAA.”225  The CFAA is focused on 
“unauthorized” or “exceeding authorized” access and damage that subsequently arises.  Despite 
the fact that “bots” may use the information provided in a different way, the access is not violated.  
“Bots” may be at odds with a Terms of Service policy, but may still access a company’s website 
for its intended function and thus is not a CFAA violation.226  Websites are designed to allow users 
to accomplish some specific purpose.  Especially with public websites that anyone can access and 
use, “in no sense can [a “bot”] be considered an ‘outside hacker.’”227 
The CFAA does not forbid using a “protected computer” for any prohibited purpose, but only 
for “unauthorized” or “exceeding authorized” access.228  Terms of Service do not govern who has 
authorization to access, which could be more in-line with “access.”229  They may speak to 
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measures, but this goes beyond “access” and into topics not under the CFAA.230  Website owners 
can limit means of access contractually through Terms of Service, but Congress never intended to 
criminalize Terms of Service violators under the U.S. Code, and did not incorporate contractual 
breaches into the design of the CFAA. 
Previous CFAA convictions based on Terms of Service breaches often concerned behavior that 
was independently illegal or touched on public policy concerns.  When an individual engaged in 
cyberbullying that ultimately resulted in a suicide, the jury originally convicted the individua l 
under the CFAA.231  The court recognized that a website owner should be able to determine the 
extent that the public can view information on his website.  Likewise, the court found that website 
owners “can relay and impose those limitations/restrictions/conditions by means of written notice 
such as Terms of Service or use provisions placed on the home page of the website.”232  While this 
is true, it is an entirely different argument to say that those members of the public who do not abide 
by the owner’s terms go beyond breach of contract and into potential criminal sanctions.   The 
court found that it was conceivable “access” could be limited by Terms of Service based on 
standard definitions, and other courts have interpreted “access” in this way.233  Nevertheless, such 
an interpretation of “access” cannot be used to justify criminal convictions.234  If a “conscious 
breach of a website’s [T]erms of [S]ervice” is enough to be deemed “access without authoriza t ion 
or in excess of authorization,” the law becomes too tenuous and affords too much discretion to law 
enforcement and too little notice to internet users.235  Because of the court vacated the jury 
conviction.236 
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Some courts have found the CFAA potentially applicable in cases where the user acted as any 
individual would in providing business to the website owner, but did so using means against the 
Terms of Service.  In a case involving event ticket resellers, the website owner sought crimina l 
charges when a competitor purchased bulk tickets off the owner’s website.237  Although the case 
settled prior to any potential conviction, the District Court allowed an indictment to stand despite 
the fact that the alleged violator purchased tickets, for the same price any user would have and 
only used “bots” to acquire as many tickets as possible, providing the website owner with 
income.238  Although the defendant argued code-based restrictions were basically means for the 
website owner to enforce its contractual agreement and not grounds for a CFAA claim239, the court 
found the CFAA potentially applicable even when the only information obtained was accessible 
to other users.240  Interpreting the Drew case, the court found breach of contract claims not 
necessarily covered by the CFAA, but breach of code-based restrictions more in line with 
“hacking.”241 
 
iii. Prosecutorial Discretion Is Not A Valid Means of Controlling The CFAA 
 
Some commenters argue that the district court and jury had the law right in Drew and 
“theoretically the law fit[] the crime as charged.”242  The argument is that prosecutors did the right 
thing in favoring a misdemeanor charge as opposed to a felony.243 
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While prosecutorial discretion can theoretically fill the gap between what is a serious crimina l 
wrong and what is unwanted but, to some, borderline illegal, in practice it provides too much 
leeway in sentencing and places way too much power in non-legislative government hands.  At 
the same time, if Terms of Service set the parameters for a CFAA violation any time automated 
programs or “bots” are used, the scope of the government’s prosecutorial authority is determined 
by private parties in how they unilateral draft the terms.244  CFAA violations based on Terms of 
Service contracts allow website owners to, in essence, become private attorneys general and 
control the limits of legal internet use. 
Those who believe any “bot” use contrary to a website’s Terms of Service can lead to crimina l 
liability may argue the true purpose of the CFAA would be deterrence.  The threat of crimina l 
liability, according to some, should be enough to deter individuals who would otherwise employ 
automated programs to act against a website owner’s preferences.245  It is easy to argue small-time 
“bot” use will not be punished by the CFAA and prosecutors will seek to only penalize those who 
operate on a large scale with malicious intent.  Theory, however, rarely comports to reality. 
While the threat of criminal prosecution may deter individuals from using automated “bots” 
contravening a website’s Terms of Service, it could also lead to an actual criminal prosecution and 
jail time.  Relying on the discretion of private website owners and government prosecutors to set 
the scope of a federal act is dangerous and unprecedented.  What happens when the alleged contract 
violator meets a prosecutor who wants to set an example or the controversy touches on a politica l 
candidate’s platform, or hits a nerve with some other individual in power?246 
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Aaron Swartz, a computer programmer responsible for building RSS, Reddit, and Creative 
Commons used his technology based skillset to promote information transparency over the 
internet.247  His creations are used daily by millions of people.248  In late 2010 and early 2011 
Swartz allegedly downloaded 4.8 million JSTOR articles from MIT servers, most likely to make 
the academic research freely available to the public.249   
There is no debate that what Swartz did was illegal and technically violated the CFAA—the 
information was not otherwise public, but was password protected.  Swartz seemed to recognize 
this as well, but also knew that MIT promoted freedom of information and the power of collective 
thought and Swartz believed he “likely wouldn’t get in too much trouble,”250 because the only real 
damage he caused by making journal articles publicly available was delay in access time for true 
JSTOR users.  
Swartz’s belief was wrong and the government abused discretion and decided to use him as an 
example.  Initially, the court issued a blanket protective order keeping Swartz from distributing 
the documents.251 
Swartz was indicted on numerous federal charges including multiple violations of the CFAA252  
In an apparent attempt to use Swartz as a sacrificial lamb and discourage future CFAA violations, 
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the US Attorney indicted Swartz on charges that carried a potential 35 years in prison and a $1 
million fine.253  Rather than face criminal prosecution and serious prison time, Swartz committed 
suicide in January 2013.254 
Political figures and members of the public recognized the danger in leaving so much 
discretion to prosecutors.  Even a prominent US Senator who endorsed the CFAA and argued 
digital theft is still theft questioned the US Attorney’s conduct.255  Senator John Cornyn wrote to 
Attorney General Eric Holder, questioning the prosecutorial misconduct surrounding the Aaron 
Swartz case.256  Cornyn questioned the proportionality of the conduct to the penalty and the 
retaliatory motives of the prosecution.257  To prevent a similar a similar situation and alleviate any 
fears for prosecutorial abuse, Aaron’s Law was proposed.258  Unfortunately the law has stalled and 
there remains the fear that prosecutors can arbitrarily enforce the CFAA how they please. 
Prosecutorial discretion is also a problem because of the duplicative nature of the statute. By 
using redundant terms, the CFAA punishes one act multiple times.259  A prosecutor can easily 
stack charges on an individual, threatening them with serious jail time.260  This leverage can 
pressure a violator to accept a deal and plea to one charge, thinking it is their best alternative given 
the situation.261  This bullying tactic can be abused both at trial and sentencing to severely punish 
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individuals who may commit minor infractions given the language of the statute.262  Unfortunately, 
it can also lead to suicide when the threats become too real and an unknowing violator is backed 
into a corner.263 
At the same time, if a fear of prosecutorial abuse were not troublesome enough under the 
current CFAA structure, the Obama administration has called for stronger CFAA penalties, which 
would tip further towards possible abuses of discretion.264  The Obama administration has altered 
its stance numerous times over the previous few years, but consistently favors increasing penalties 
for most “bot” or code-based actions.265  While the proposal aims to ensure “that insignificant 
conduct does not fall within the scope of the statute,” and supposedly focuses more on prosecuting 
“insiders who abuse their ability to access information to use it for their own purposes,” some of 
the proposed text would still increase “bot” penalties and leave much to discretion.266  The origina l 
proposed criminal provisions, and those still currently proposed, would add a mandatory three-
year minimum penalty for damaging certain computers.267  Most criminal violations of the CFAA 
would have increased potential penalties under the Obama administration’s proposal.268  The 
newest proposal for the CFAA would expand on the definition of “exceeds authorized access” and 
encompass uses that the accesser knows the computer owner would not want.269 
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Leaning towards the opposite end of the spectrum, the justice department acknowledged the 
potential for abuse and inferred it was open to shoring up some ambiguity.270  The justice 
department recommended congressional action to amend the CFAA and make it more difficult for 
the government to prosecute less serious statutory violations.271 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) is a useful tool to limit theft and damage to digita l 
information, but courts and prosecutors have arbitrarily enforced and overextended it.272  It has 
been stretched beyond what Congress intended, to include actions that cannot legitimately be 
deemed criminal.  Prosecutors will have no reason to focus their energy on truly harmful crimina l 
behavior if courts continue to construe the CFAA more and more broadly, and encroach on 
rulemaking themselves.273   
When Congress first created the CFAA and some state legislatures followed suit with related 
state statutes, no one had any idea that there would be something like the global Internet, much 
less "bots" that would be mining data on such a huge scale.  “Bots,” just like any technology, can 
be encouraged and used in a positive way or exploited and misused.  They are not inherently bad, 
but in fact can lead to tremendous advances.  The CFAA was designed to be flexible and adapt to 
future technology and innovation, but it has proven unable to keep pace.  It is really a case of a 
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statute that has been left in the dust by technology.  The answer to this problem is legislation, not 
judicial or prosecutorial interpretation and expansion. 
